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Title DE GAU:L,.LtEAND F'Rl''1-NCO~GE;FUv1ANf1ELA~10l' S 19!t5.1962
Abstl'Qot appt>oVlSd
The'd1Sluemberment and reparations policy FrMnQfJ follow-
ed at the end ot World War II as 5n oocupying power in Germany
WtilS til t:radl tional Qpproach or the vietor to the vanquished.
The Saar, the Ruhr, and the Rhineland were the borderlands
long in dispute. One new element was the idea that while
demanding these territories, an attempt at natfon~l r8pp.
roohement could be carried on through educatlon~l measures.
For mmyGermans the University at bhllnz did not balance.
the dl$n1Qntled factories.
This postwar period w~s characterized by European
economic 111s. The 1947 l~arshall Plan, an AmericQn ap-
proach to restore Europe to economic health through 00-
operative erfort, was inaugurated. It, st1mulQteo. the guro ...
pe8n integration movement which flourished during the 1950's.
The 1948 Council of Europe had not lived up to ex.p~ctstions,
in the eyes of }I~uropefin federalists; but the next try, the
European 001111 and Steel OOlnrnuni ty. (1952) proved a lusty
child o,f the funotionQlist movement. \1hen theF:uropem
Defen.se Cornrnunit'y died, (19,$4) it embittered FrQ,nco-OermQrl
relations for .Q while. The EUI'ope&ilu Atomio Energy Community
,9,nd the :&;uropean Economio Corrununlty completed the EuropeQn
Community in 1958. Through the o.t'ganizatlons foreconom.l0
integra tion, Franoe snd GermatlY have, in spl te of disputes
and crises, been able to compromise 11{,l.8JlY divergent drives
in the interest of restoring Europe to full economic cQpac~
ity. The North At.l~ntleTre,\tyOrganization, (1949) which
o~lg1nated lisa jo.1ntmi'litary defense and symbolized
\~'estern unity in the fQceot Soviet aggression, became a
a.,edbed of discox'd between France met Ge.r:rflany.
'When Genersrl de Gaulle beCQme president in 1958, he
p-ur·scued. "n active poliey of rapproachement wi'th Adenauer t 8
Fed~rail GertnQU Republleseek1ng to establish a Paris-Bonn
. '/H~sP: '
axis on which to base French Ie aderahipln the European
Community. As leader o~ ~ West EuropeQn bloc independent
of the United St'ltes, Fr~nce would hold that place in the
first rank of na tiona thQ t de Gaulle be:liev~d she must have,
Oh«;.neellor AdenQueV cooperated with the French president
bea·~.use he believed a tightly knit Europe~n group would bene-
fit GermSin lnter~st$. The high point in Franco-Germm rap-
prochement occurred in 1962 during the $ummer exchange of
atQte visits, but by the time the 'l'reaty WQS signed and
ratified, (1963) the tone of' Franco-GermQn relations had
chtlilnged.
Disagreements on mil! tary polioies in NA'lIO,on pol!t-
ic~l developments in the !.iuropeG-rl Community, and on agri-
cul turQl poli..¢1es in E&1C .. :ill res.ohed serious proportions
&t the time that Chancellor Ernll.rd took offioe in 1963.
i],'he Erhard governrnent' a shift 01" emphasis f:rom at Europe
focused on Pranee to the Atlantio allianoe focused on the
United states led Presldent de Gaulle to consider Ii new
pOlicy to replaoe FrQnco-German rapprochement whioh had
been his primary strategy until 1963. Frs.nco-Russian re-
latioDS became notioeably 'Warmer atter the extension of
long term credits by France 'to the Sovifl./t U:nio:n. Germany
protested this new turn 1n French policy. A closer French-
Russian r~18tionahlp tn".,. add. to the discord which cooled
th~ Franoo-Germ9n aocord of 1962.
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DE GAULLE Ac~D FRANCO-GERMAN RFLA,TlOOS,1945-1965
I. DI TRODUCTION
France and Germany are major pillars ot western
European strength, Their rels,tionshlp to each other is
significant in determining the course ot European history.
France entrusted theguldance of that reletionship to
Charles de Gaulle when he beoame president of the Fifth
French Republic 111 1958. The seven years of hi$ term 10
otrice saw major shifts. In' Franco~G.rman rela tiona,. The
pu.rpose of this paper 1s to eXaM.lne the developmen ts that
took plaoe during thia time in order to understand ho-wand'
why this relationship progressed as it did.
However, nQ pErrlod in history 1s a self-corl talned un! to'.
The events or the post World Wer II era, wereext:remely influ-
ential in 88 u8b11~h1ng de Gaull.' s world. He had to deal
with ~rend$ begun before he came toott1ee. The o:rganiza-
tions which promoted close contact with Germeny werae shaped
under the Fourth Republic. The foreign policies which set
the tone of' Franco-Gattman relations were formulated by hi.
predecessors. The new president had to accept, adapt, or
reject policies al~ead1 in operation as well as originate
his own.
At the end of World War II Fran.ce WiltS in a difficult
position. The military defeat of 1940 had shown that she
was unable to defendj herself against German armies. The
J,
foreign ocoupat1on,.~ndu;reduntil all110st the end of the war,
had exhausted 'the Frenoh economy. The relatively minor role
France played in the allledV'1ctory did notrtlnstateher 9,8
a gz-eat power. 1 WheniCharles de Gaulleoame to powerbriet'-
11 at the end ot World War II, he set forth three goals tor
French tore;ign pollcy. military security, eoonomic recover,.,
and great power status, WhrOU~lout most of the Fourth
Republic, the tiret two goals were the main objectives of the
French goverrunen t.
To atta.in military security, the tbreat of Germany had
to be destroy-edt In August 194$, Generel de Gaulle told
President Truman ot the P:r:·ench dem.ands tor ail dismembered Bnd
dcmi11tari.ed Ge:rD18n1~ The a.ax-wQs to beoom~ French prop-
erty; the Ruhr was to be detached from Germany end put under
international control, to be used to benefit Ge:rma.nl'8
neighbors, The Rhineland was to be pr$vertted trom ever be-
coming an invasion route to Prance; Germany wou.ld be,de-
mi11tar1~ed. In order to prevent the rise of another milt-,
tant tlermanY', NQzl Ideaswere to be ellm1nti.ted through the
stressing ot dem,oor$tic prinoiples in German schdols.
lstQtlley Hottman, In Searoh of France (Ne~ York: Harpel'
and Row PUblishers, 196)T, 31~. --
3
'rhe German goyernmen t would be I t eorgaulzed in a demo-
cratic form. 1
The political s1tuatiml ohanged rapidly after
de Gaulle maa.e claar the Freneh post tlon regarding Germany.-
The lJold war oS.used the tIn! ted States and, Sri tal.n to look
on West Germany &s a potential ally against the Soviet Uniono
They c.omb111ed their occupation zonas and began to plan what
became the central gov$l"nmental institutions of a future
Germany. Throughout 1945 and 1946. Franc, consistently re-
Jeoted the trend toward centralization fQr- Germany. She
fesl"ed that accepting cen.tralized institutions would also
me:an acoepting the existing boundaries or Germany end thus
force her to rellnquishcla.lms to the Saar and the Runr. 2
Oentralization of German Instlt'utlons would also mean 1nter-
terence in ho\lo1 j"ll'ance ran her zone of occupied Germany.
Since F!lrance intended to Qchleve part of her economio scour-
.tty through exploitation of he:r oocupation zone, ahe fought
centralizing measures. In the search tor }f~enoh economic
security, exploitation of the occupation zone was an ex-
pediency.Long l-ange pla.ns were aimed at bolstering the
Fl-eheh economy through possession of the Saar-'s coal and
80cess to the Ruhr and Rhineland industries.3
Unexpectedly, a basis for a Franoo-German
IF. Roy Willis, ~ren~ei ,Ge..~~l' and. the New E~rope
(Stendord: Stanford universfty· Press,1.96'5T; 1'";";
3Ibid., 32.
-
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rapprochement was laid in the FI~ench oocupation zone at the
sarne time that ]!~f.j.nce was pursuing a policy ofexploi tatlon
end r(:?p8~ationa. '.rh1s was the educs: tlon9,l pl)ogram insti.·
tuted by France, ranging f:rOrll reforms in the German primary
,schools to the foundation of the new University of ~hl1nt.
'Youth programs of religious andpoli tica,l orge.nlzations
were encou.r'aged and many co:ntBots between French and German
'youth were sponsored by the governruent to re~vive 41 German
a d.'i'f!11"U t10n for French civil1zatlon. l
The third. goal of ,French foreign pollcy set by
de Gaulle in 194L~ lay dormm t during most of the .l1'ourth
Republic, being revived only during its l$ter years. General
de GAulle had set the keynote of the search f()r 8. return 'to
great power status tor France when he said France m.ust
llresume a plaoe in the :elrat rank'-· and »m,a1ntain it. n He
had hoped. to achieve this first rank through acc}ord wi th
the Soolet Union, but the opposition of the Soviet Union to
French representation in the German ocoupation ended Fl'enoh
hopes ora Flraneo-Russ1an a111s.n08. Even the x·ole of a third
par.. ty m.ed,.iator between East md West WfiUJ prealuded by the
Russia!) att1tude.Fll aIlCe had refused to Jolnher zone with
those of Britain and the United S~tQtes, had accepted
Germany's 'b1astern front leI's , had. included. the Soviet Union
on .French pl6al1s fov -th$ internQ,tionalization of th., auhr,
but all this feiled to earn Russian gratitude and cooper-
ation Q s the .French had hope.d. E1' i ta1:n an.d the Un 1ted
States ind:tcated t.helr t4111ingness to coopere_te with French
d~siW1S, but the Soviet Union refused, though the French
Connnun,iat }')arty supportJ'd France t a program. 1 When F:renoh
bids for great power stfJ.tus tniled, end F~ench hopes tor
econolnic and 10111 tary secur1tl through explol tation of
Ge"onny faded, $ new polley had to be developed,
American action provided directio:n for & newF'rGrloh
approaoh to r@lat1ons with Germany. On April 12, 19J+7,
'Walter Lippmann pUblished 61n article, "Cassandra Speak.1ng, t.
in whioh he w61rl1ed that q'rhe truth 11 tbstpoll tics.! and
econo:mie meS.8ures for Axtie:rlean aid to 'Europe on e. scale
l4hich no reeponslbles'tatesman has yet v~ntured to .hint at
will be needed. in thE):n6Xt yeel' or $0. »2 As if lntulfille
men t of thl s prophecy, General George Marsh&ll, in June 19L.j..7I
proposed Q plan ,tor American aid to reconst~u(~tEuropet
Mo,rshall Plan Rid waato· Iflake J'ranee no longer depe.nden t on
theeJiPloi ta t1on()t' GeJ'!1lsny.:3
Another faotor whlchQa.used Franoe to change her
policy tow~.rd OeJmlar~y was._ g:c'owing apprehension of the
Sov'!et Union.
lWillis, ~.2.
2Herbel't Luethy, France At)81nst Herself (.New York:
ftleridian Books Ino. I 19;$), 3~J. ,.. .. ~
3\"~:tl1i s I 29.
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Some developments which indioated that prospective da.nger
lay with RUBSi. rather thQn Germany l'J~re the COftlMUnls't coup
in Czeohlosovak111, the Berlin blookad~, and th~ Ruseifm re-
fusal of ~la:r8hQ1IP1.n aid. These events persuaded France
to accept the London Agreements of July 1948. 'These .gree-
mente denied :mast or F1"anee'e original claims in Germany.
InsteQ-d of Q permanen tly 1nternational1zt')drtuhr, the te~~p­
orary International Authority tor the Ruhr (:rAR) was
established; 1n plaoe ot • sep.rate oocupation zone, a de-
layed ~lB1on with the combined British and American zones
was arriltlged; and in lieu or a deoen tr-.11zed German govern-
ment, Q tight tederatlonwas provided. Although the Frenob
poed.. t10n on the 8a,,1" wa 8 recogI1 tzed, no provision for the
Rhineland WQS made.
The major p.ttoblem t.eing the Fow..th R~public was
economio l'eeovery. The }1arahall Plan provided Frsnce wi th
• n~w m~thod to Qohieve this. Not only was money made
available to reoon8truotEurope's economy-,-but the Plam de-
mQnded that the EuX'opean oountries part101p#ting must prac-
tice clQee eoonomic oooperation. In a speeoh .t H8Pv.rd on
JunfJ5, 1947, General Marshalllns1sted that economic re-
covery 1s ftth~ ·bu~iness or the Europe.ns. The in! ti.tive
• • • must come fromP1urope. • • • The progr~m should be a
joint one agreed to by .. number, it not all E:urop49n nations. n
1.~., 23 ..
2Eugene Wll Castle, The Ore.•t Giveawall (Chioago: HenryRegn~ryComp.n11 1957), ~ -- - --
7The Europe~ns we:re to work out production levels to be
achieved for the next four years and decide how much would
be needed to :make up the difference between what could be
earned by the E;uropetAn exportse:nd whG t had to be expended.
for European economic recovery. The preamble of th.e cong-
re~$lonal act which made General Marshall's proposal law
stated specifically' that th. pu:rpose ot the aotwas to en-
courage European 1rltegratlon.1 This Arr!ex:~can stimulus to
Europes.nun1 ty boosted the spirits ot the ftEuropean.s't who
worked tild hoped for a United states or Europe. By this
raeQns th~ rOQus of ,FrffJnoh foreign policy beo~me F...uropean
unlfica tion.•
At first. the French had 8 very broad conoept of th.
Europe Wl11ch unification would enoompass. The roreign
ministers or Great Britain and France, Bevin andBldault
respectively, invited f1t·st Soviet foreign minister Molotov,
and then, every other Eu.ropeall foreign minis ter to confer
with tbemon the be,stway to gr,asp the initiative which
General l'fla:rshall offered.. 2 The refusal ot the Soviet Union
ond of the other East Buropenn countI-ies to Q,ocept 'Maarahall
l?lari aid 11m! ted partners Q.va11abl~\,.for the European move-
ment to the natiollS ofWest-.,m Europe~ The next os.llto
E"urapean unity w•. S an invitation 1~sued by enthusisstic
}t'~urope~n faueralis ts to the beneficiaries of the Marshall
loAn thony N'Ut t ing:,Euro;eeW111 !.2! ~!.~ (New York:
It'7tederi ok Is II ~Pl'Qeger, 1960)" Ie;-;-
2Ibid.
8Plan to torm the Oouncil of: Il;u:r-ope •
.fiiuropean feder'll:tstshopedthereby to st.rt a poll tical
1ntegrs,tlon of Europe, i'he Council was to be the t'uturt par-
liament of .. United Sta tee of lturope, but Dri taln vetoed
any propo$Ql that would m.ke the Council 3lnythlng strongoX'
than a oonsultative body,l In doing eo, ahe further naprow""
the Frerleh choice ot pa:rtners tor .. trulY' integrated Europe.
The only other country of eompa~.ble size &nd resouroes with
which Franoe could align hex-selt ",.sWest Germany.
. Betore. Franoe and Germany oould tom the h.ub o.f ..
unified We$te1'7l Europe, old Ftllench, derna-nas had to be aband-
oned.- However" :ma.ny Froncr:unen, even as lat. as Novemberl9$O,
were not reconoiled to ~e thought ot rel1.nquish1ng claim~
on the Saax-or furthe~ ~eparat1.ons. -rx-ance showed her re~
lu~tQnoe by at first opposing the PetexaebeZ'8 Protocol whioh
admltt.d Gerro..ny to the Council ot Europe, diminished the
dismantling of German faotories, gave the Germans a voice
in the IAR, and gr·an.ted Germany ~l.rshall Plan &1. id. Sinoe
most of the dismantling had b.en ·in the French zone for ex-
port to France, it 18 not su~prising that French industrial-
ists objected. 2 At the same time approximately that French
businessmen and Indu:strla11sta were raqulred to accept the
PetepsbergProtoool, they were presented wi th 8. whole- ne w
outlook on France' srelatlonehip to German'y by Frenoh
1
.Ibid., 26.
9funetlon6itlists. Ftlnctionaliats ai:med at Slttaining Eur'opEHUl
unity by Q step by step p~oe~ss in which limited functions
are performed through'soupr4lnatiQnal powers. Their new look
for French industry WIlS bas$d on a realist1c 9ppralsfil of
Europe's need to destroy old barriers and a d~t6rm1n.tion
to oper~ FrancefsprQteeted economy to freer trading. 1
The immediate economic taotorfJ that induced -lean ,lvlonnet and
.his cOllea,gues t·o draw up the Schuman Flm "W,ere the situ-
ation of overproduotion':1n< coal and steel which &'Urope faced
just before the Ko.pean \'\I61,;r and the neceaa1 ty of better pro-
tection ft'om the flu01;Ua.t$,,?:ns ot the· bus;lnes8 cycle, for
both oonsume;r and produQer~ ~rne Sohuman Pliln .founded the
Europf!Jall COfill and Ste~laom.l11unity (:IDOSO) to>help solve
E:Ul'opean eoonomic I11s 6S well as provide thefoundatlon .ror
eventuail po;J..i ticalunlon. The .greates t eeonom1cQaset to
France or Eose -wee &lceessto RUMooal, eVen though the
.f'" •
ine£rl(~1ent mines in oth'er par;8 of France we~eput out
of business +3·
For ulany the morelnrp<>~tant issue .t stQke in the
Schum~n Pltlin was political 19& ther than eeol1011l1e. The exe-
QutivebrQtich of ECSO,cIJlled the High Authority, would be
the key to a cheok.on.I'~vtt~,llzed Germah 1:ndustry~ Qveto'
to future German arrrua.menta irJ.duB try; wd thus to Gern1&n
~.bili ty to make war. The price of this check would be the
....', .*1:
3Ibld., 104.
--
sacrifice or a certain amount of Frenoh sovereignty. on
this issue the Europeiln integrationists took the st&nd that
I
nationalism was passe tortoday's world. Whe1r opponents
maintained that nationalism was a. legitimate viewpoint and
that thelsaw no reasont.o ~egQl?,d a European nationalism
1.8 supel'1o~ to FrenohO"ational1sm.1 'While some Frenohmen
SQwECSC as .. sacrifice of French sovereignty, Germana SGW
it in jtl..stthf!' opposite light for themselves: an end to
o'p(e~~.tlon~ True, Ger:man>opponente to West Ellropean$uprs-
patti>n$.-J..ln t-srat1oncolliplairJ,ed ot- 11m!ted aovepe1gn~1;
distrusted-Frenoh oompetlt:1.on in industry; ·sus;pecte~·a
.' ,
F~enoh p:l.an todom1nat@Lp.o11tlcally, .and tear-edtheeff'eet
on>ttiture German un1r~oat16n. In sp1te or these oomplaIn't. ,
the overwhelming German des!:pe to end ocoupation status
lett no real question ot'German acceptance ot the SohumQn
Pl~tl,2 In 1952...rt'ert"Wo years of .plannlngand. violent
deba.te, the Sri t1sh rejected EJCSC, but b"trance ,; Italy"West
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands_ and' Luxembourg aec~pted
it.
The functlona1.1,ects who designeagCSO buil'tinto it
f~..~ures that oould Peused to develop Q very closely
tederated EUt'ope. The foundation tor a new European trend'
wa$ seeuxlely ~a,1d. The organization or Eose branches set a
"
. , .laay"mo.nd Ar~n,Franc!,'.Steadtastand", ChQn~lnSi (CQmbrldge,}t1QasQchueettst HarvardOnlvers!l;y iSress, 196 ), 1.59.
2Willis, 112.
11
pSittern readily adaptable to ne\4 Qdditlons to the li:uropean
COIrulluni ty." Tbe European Cormnuni ty lUi a whole 1s comprised
of: themuropem Coal Qnd Steel Community (EOSC), the
European Atomic Energy Community (EuratoJJl), and the
bluropean Economio Comtl'1unlty (EEC, usually clalled the Cotnrt1on
r1arket). E$ch of the three component$ o.t the European
Oommunity (ECSe, :mEO, end .Euratom) has 1~s own i,ndividual
exeeu.tlv,e.1~hfJ EOSe exeoutive b:rQrloh 1s called the High
Authol'tlty; the EEO and Euratom deslgn&\te theirs as Com-
missions., This Branch 1s to guard .ESSe intere s ts by ini t-
lating and advocQ~ll1g legislation to put t~eaty' provisIons
into effect, by l'Qisl:ngrevenue to cilrryoutits Qotionsl
bYP911cing ECse torreapect to the treaty and High Authority
rulings, by aiding 8.greements between' m~mbers, anab,- stimtl-
la ting turthev aotion lnbuildlng the European Oorrmrunl t;r.l
There is Jl.lso an EOSC' Oouncilor :Hln18ters which acts as I,
decIsion'lflaking body. This Council consists' or national
.repre sen;atlv8$ who havepoweZ'$ whl~h, in some cases, are
:1mmediQtely binding on all membe:rs. ' ,On several l$sufts
there is no :natlonral veto, the deoision being taken by
Ima.jority vote. This bodydeeides on spec.ific proposals
made by-the exeout1vebrBnch. Me and J£uratom also halve
sepa.ra te eouno lis of m1n istera,bllt the same men usually
___ i. _
12
.sit. on all th~ee oounc11s. 1
i11e oth.x- branches of the l~uropean Community are'
shared in' common by ECSC,EEC~ and ~uratom, The Court ot
JU$tioe &$ juc;r101ary, &xerciaing the power or Q supreme
eouJ:'t. :tts seven JUdges glv& f~Ql decisions on indiViduals
andgov!J:t.'~ent$. The Cour-t deoides if the acta of the ,three
oomponen ts of the Oomm.un1ty accord with tb.aome Trea't1
~h~o~ es;abllshed thern.T!1e' European Parllment c6ul.(i'be
- .' - - .
con.~·"'d.,r8d the leg1$1.t1'\1:.,~::br.nchof the EuropeQn eptrIt~unlty.
~ '. - ,'., -- ~, . ", . ' ..-, . '. ~
~hf8':.$s.mbll QOlls1s~~fot'142 delegates nom1n·.',tedbY' .
.... :., .
,national p~r:t.iament$.; These delegates a~t' nqt .seated in
na;t;tbnal g:rQup,. but in .t3.p~8tlIi tlon$l po11't10'8.1 groups: Con-
,-
aerv.• tlve tr'om -. Italy" Prince ,Germany and othe:r member na.
tIO);f$ 8~ t together •• one,gvoup. The Pa:rllam~nt catltoroe
r.sl'gnation or theexeeut1.,vets (EOSO High Authority.EEO and
Eu-r'''tom Commissions )1)~.tw()-th1rds vc;>te ot.no oonfidenoe.
~"',,, -, :;":... ,:,' -;'" ",;. :.'
1t1:$ con$ul t •. t1,.e oo",ce"t-.ln m. tters and publj.sh,esf-ts viewa
on executl'V8 .Ot1on8~ '$'bX'OUgh the assemblyts ritt~t)l"l stand-
ing ,ooram! t'Peea, it wo~ks~owar'd the fusion of markets and
e.x.~:oilne s budga t $~2
Accredited amlHUIt!adors to the EuropeanCo11'mnmit'Y' from
the ns.tlonal gove;l"nment$otrnembersta,tes make up Q Comm.
1ttee of Permanent aepX'es~':ntatlvea.. ~i8 group processes
de'tailed doouments, determines nation.tl positions and aots
2I,b1d., 21.
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as 11ason betweentheo thr'e~ Oo:m.."'nunity ~xecutlv~:a land the
member nations' govevnmertts. f>h~present~_t1ves of V'4Ilrious
Isbor, 1.ndtlstry JI busin~ss, -$ndprot'ess!o.nal groups m411ke 'Up
the Eoonomlc' $ndSoci&l OOfl'uuittee. This Comtnittee, whioh
~cts as Q p:ressure group,ls Q o~on$ultQtivebodYQttQdhed
to the Council of 141nis ters. 1
Tbus through them~H;~hiner'1 of the Community FrlffiCe
ch~l'lged ,from all economio polioy or exploitQtl~n, wltnGermany
in the role of v1ot1mto Ob.e of oooperat1on, withGttI~nany as
lit partner. The.'littempt' to e,xtend the Corrununi ty to cov~r a
':m.l1ttary policy tOWQ~GeltrrUjlnS" p~oved lesa suocessful. The
'Bluropoan. Deten$~ ,pommun1ty (EOe) was a. ,Frenchetto:et.eto
less~n the impQct ora rearmed Germany,2 This effort grew
out ot the events, beginnIng in. 1946, which l:ntenalf'led the
Cold l'Jar and createdllin atmosphere- oC :fe~r 11'1 France, and
elsewhere • .3 The e5trlte$t~!$:.ot'cm to this te&P of Soviet
sggresslon: 1nWestern Eul'ope wQsthe signing of the Atlen tic
Ps,otin Ap~ll 1949, cre~ting the North Atlantlc Treaty
OrgQ:cizQtlon ('NATO). Itl hance's view, ot course, Germ~ny
'w8sexcludet1 from NA'l'O. In s, session of the Frenoh r~"tlon-
9.1 Assembly in 1949, ~'oreign t-'llnlster Schuman stated that
Germ.ny should never be able to rea~ "except by Q graYe
(Js
lIbld., 121.
-
2E. Drexe1 Godfre'9~ , Jr" ~jhe Gov~rnn1ellt otFr~e.nce
(2d ed; Nell1York;. TholUQS '1. CrowerIOomplilniJ-r9b~l,r97,•
.3Luethy, 355.
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er~oron the p~rt 01" Prance. tt1
Considering France's position on Germfiuresrmarnent, the
out1?:reQk of the'KoreanWar preoipitated a sftuQtion which
placed&. tremendous str.alt.l. on }J"'rQ.,rlco-Germ&lo relsitlons·.
FjaElt""W~st ,tensions reduc~d FrQuee'" a role 1nthe ,Atl"nttc
Ql.~i.noebeOQuse hercommitl)'!ell,ts outside Europe mem't she
co'U~d no,tnu~keQ larg~,mir1.tary eOlltrlbu:tlon to NAtrO (I
Germany;, on the other hand,ach1eved a more 'active p8.rt in
. .
interna,t40nal arrairsbecQUS80fher ml11taz.y potentlQl.2
--.wrthAlllerloan troop$oontrl11..tted to the Korean War, Qdd-
ltlonal United State's force$ for Europe were unlikely.
Consequently Europe's military weakness WIi$ evident at a
t1tl1.~when European tena1onswere' also rlsing.3 Th$ Oouncil
ot:mu,t'ope propo8edaEu~ope$ln army finan-oed by EuropeQn
funds glthere-d from Eurdpt',~n taxes, but mAking notnen t10n
or: Oer,'m,n pa:rtioipation. 1'he United. Sta.tes deeld~d thQt
Ge~~"n p~~~;Plo'1patlon was neoessary.4
. ,- , :
When troth tb$ 'Unit.,Hf 'StQ tea and the Councl1qf·Europe
cQl',1.11'1gfor EurQpeantroc):p~, Ren' Plevefl, . the· FX-tU1Ch 'premier,
produced Q" pl4in for aEu~opeQn Defense Community. '£ho
:1' .
jPleY~ll 'Pl~n hoped to ,aontt:a.ioQ raearmed Qerm~y.':"bY' ititegrQ t ..
lng' <}ont1nental'europ~$!l,;·,rmed.forces into 6heml1ftiiry
lAltred Grosse:r,"'Prance and. Germany 'in the Atlantic
Communi ty, ff Inte:rna t1on~lOl)t?iQn1$atlQn,XVII.·.(SUltUner, 1963,
554~" ... .. .. -
2~,'t?ld., 555. 3W1111$, 145,. 4Ibid., 131.
1,
estt.ilblishment which would operate under" 8uprQnatlonal
politlctil author!ty oontrolled by-the governments 61:, the
pQrtieipants" ttl ,Premier Pleven ~,nd supporters o:r the 'plan
stressed these polntst (1) (lermany WQsnot a m~mberot the
Atllult1c Pact but did benefit 1'Z.Onl the Fa.ct's protection;
thtIJU?e.r()~e she should share in the defense ot W~atem
Europe trom possible attack; (2) tba pl$n would turther
Eu:ropeilr1 integration; (.3) Frsnoo-GermGn reooncl11Ailtlon
wPuld be promoted; and (4) GermarlY would bekept.tromh.v-
ing £\ na~tionalQrmyr.2
Deba tea over 1ltpGW~X'.··long Imd ha.rd~ Freriobopp()n-
epte prO,ies tedtha t th~,' s'upran'tti onal aspects of .the, plan
'~-:',':': ",'>- ,";::" ,"
For $ome:~ Gerrrilhl l'earmament in any fO~W'tS- un.
> ' :: •• ,)""",, " "';
.oeep1a~ble;· others it~,~;edthat suoh an arnl'ymightpr()voke
Russian inte~vent1on. Pr,~chcr1tics ,also p("lnted:Ql.t-~ thQ t
. . • • '. '.
th~,'¢rlgin&l plan had b.enmQc;ilfled to allow ' n.atio;nal units,
S11d,·~:thatthe »,r~nch Q~mt,.''Which'had calYlm1tm~ntsln, At:V:i.oQ
, I ' . ; ..,~._ ,",', : _, ': ;':' ',' -'>.' ;' '.:'. , , .)
Qnd~~1ai would ,beWe~k"t1;~d.,by; the sUP~i.natiOn611:q~R11ty
,::"'. : '.<. :, ..':-',' .. ,.:-.
or~})c..3 ·Placing the. Gertn4\ns, under a supranat1onai'lilu-
thorlty meant tha~, t~$ ,Gerrtume would be su.b3ecttot~~t au-
th6ri tYQnd not at tbe dfspoeal· ~f the qerxruln goverllmen t.
; "..!,"." ~.;-) : 'r
Bt the same token French,:broops committed toF~DC would not
be \~nder the direction· ottheFrench govertunent.
'-
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The bitterness engend~red by the prolonged Qr.td heARted
debates over rono haa been compared to th,,-t of the Dr~yrue
Af'fair. ,Eve:ry F~rench political group spelled out; its stliind
01'1 this issue, thus hBrdenlng attitudes towlitrd it. The re-
vived nationalism thi',t appeQred in both Frtinae and GermGlny
'WQS a set-baok to Franco--German :r~COllo111atlon.l Gernumy
WQS particularly Inoensedbect.use the' Contractural Agree-
ments. which were to restore German sovere1gnty,were tied
to the a.cceptanoe of EOO. When the It''lrenoh,llri tlsh md
Amerioan foreign ministers met in Washington in Septe'rrtber
1951_ they decided German p'trtioip~tlon in EDO 'Would mean
the$nd of ocou.patlol1status.1'heretore, the ag:reenl&nts
providing tor an :Independent Federal Republic ofOe:rmany
were negotiated simultaneously with the m11itQl-Y arrange-
ments, The Cotltractu8.1Agreements could onlybecorneef.fec-
tive when (Jermany partioipated 1n Ene•. GeI'mQny naturally
saw tal denial of Qerx.nan 8ove1"elgnty 1n. the French reject:lon
of EDO.2 &ermQrl sovereignty md rearmament had to 'Wait
until the Western Europe~ln Union WtitS forMed Qnd attached to
NATO sho~tly after the 1954 death of EVa. 3 At thRt time
West GermQny renouno~d atomic, bQcte~iolog16al and ohemlcsl
wetipons, pl"oed all her troops under NATO, and entrusted
-(. IThe?s we~e lilleo hellhd arguments in Gerllumy.tbid" 1.77).
2Ibid,. 137. .'
.3Edg&r Stephenson. Furn.iss,Jr., _It'ranee Troubled A111
(New York: Harper ~nd Brotb~rs.. 196oj, 273.
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West Berlin exolusively to ,American; British Qnd Frenoh
protectlonClf 1
The effect of East-West tensions on the FI'filnco-German
rapproehement WQS aooentuQted 1nsid,e N'ATO. Because Berlin
18 $0 totally dependent on Ame:r1oarl £o%'oe$ vis-~ ..V'is the
Soviet Un1on,Germany.found het-self siding with the united
" :;
stl.te~ on issues d.ividing the Un'! t,ed Stat~8 and France.
Frs-nee's d1esatistactlon l\rlth NATO stemmed pr1marl1Y.from
'herpos1t1on as a nation hQ,vingoolonial oommittuents Qnd
fpolliber stand on nuolear'a:rms~ French unhappinessW'Qs,
a1'80' linked to a renewed French interest 1nnationQl pres-
tige" whioh began aboub1.9".
!rhePrenob Qrguedtha:t the Atl.a:nt1c Pact ~equ.l:r~d co..
operation'Unong its memOevs throughout the world, even in
Asia •.nd Atric.ul* Ola1mingto act as .. de1l'1ocra tie nation
" .
fighting communism ID"Vletnam and Alge:r1Q~ :FrQnoe expeeted
NATO to aid 1n cAr'r11ngout that task. 2 In8te.~. or aid,
her N'A'PO allies, inoluding Germany, crt t1c18ed Franoefo:r
belngunwil1ingto terminate colonialism. France reacted 01
aoouslng NATO of not doing ita job andot humiliating Fr~ce
with such criticism. The F'ourtbReptibllc f s reluctance to
relinquish Frenoh colonlesoan be attributed to motlv~s ot
na tional prestige rQthe,I' th$Il economic' rtUilSOTlS,3
lKlausEps te1n. germanl After A4.enauer (New Yorkt
Foreign Policy Association, 1964'. 6J•..,... ,
20rosser, 558. 3A~on, 15).
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The nationalism. wh1chocC$.sioned the F~ench stand on
colonialism alsopro.moted Franoe t $ desire for Q greater
voice lnthe oontrol of Nl.lolear arms. posae$~lonor nu-
clear weQpons beQa:me a l1~o,ssary status symbol tor a great
P9W~:r. .~ .. role FrQ!ice l1ished to play.1 Dlseontented with
the pOf;lltion,tnat the United States alloted her NATO allies,
·:A-:
France ultlm,.tely deo!d~d to establish anindependellt French
nucleQir t'o~oe,PreroferHende's.F'ranoe ,. put ,the program into
, I
()per~tio;n~n 19$4~ SlnceEure,tom was to stimulate and 00-'
ordil)ate nuoleQX' research, Frmce expeoted to use it to
benetither I;luelfHu' program." German insistence that all
Eurll~omettort8 be directed at purely peaoe.fUl purposes
foroed France to vel inqu:lshtha.t hope J accordingly, dlmin-
i,sh~d French, lnteres,t d~lprived mUI'Qtom of muoh ot ita
v1ta11ty.4
In 0 on trias t to theobsQ,url ty into whl~b E1;trQ tom lapsed,
its twin, the, Europeiln r~oonotnlc ..Op~Wlity; experlenOedd;ram-
atlc'.dovel.opnJ.ent. Both EUr'Qt,pnl -11.q :arwo were the result of
a:".r~l'le,w~d drive by the!ur¢'p-ean tunction,Jl11st movement.
Th~y', were conceived at,hiJ4esslna Conferen.ce, in·'1955'·an<i
-took: shape during two yeQX"$ of negotiations. The ~r.rreaty
lFurnfss', 246'. 2Godf~ey. 128.,
.3B;uratom pe:rf'oI'l'&sits fUnotions 'through 'speol.flere-
search.contraots,a docu:m.enttiltlon pool, investment gUidance
Qnd health snd safe:by st"nclards. (Robox-tLbuis Reilbroner,
;Forgl!1i ! p:nlted ,El.lr0J;?e: theSloifi !,!. the Eu.roEemOommunity,
N e'W York: PublIc :APralrscomm t ee~ 19b1 " M."yne. 11[1.
!,'·Ibld.
-
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of Rome delivered thetWOeld<llt1ons to the Europelin Com..
. . ' .,' . '.' 1
munity :tn 19,7.
olol:t~'bl.tne :for the 1rappea~ance on the t~urop$an scene t
Goodwill 14&8 high Qnd 'rQ~lco....oermQ1'l relationsr$pidly 1m-
pnoved due to sever5.1.c:ilr,o'.tillllst"noes II l')rom!nen t illnong: ,these
,.. " .. ',.,.' ..
"T"',' '- '.
was the burial of the:;\PQ'l.:f~y 'ot GermQIl d18m~iliberzneht,
-""".:".-,.,.-;
Qocomplishecl by the settle,nlent of: the. oompetitlonqve~ the
, . .'" .
'.' , ' . " ,
Ssar. A 19$$ referendum by the SaaJ'land~r'8~eJecrtedboth
FrtHl0e and Europeanlzat:J.on1n :fliV'OX" of a return to GernuUlY;
in 1951 the Saar was ortleially reunitf!tG w1tht.he Fe(i$rtitl
Republ1c,2 -Anothe:r contribution to Franoo.(}e:rm...n a,cn:rord
whioh appeared in 19.55wQ8 a decline in the fi-1ctlons which
h~d dev:eloped in Eose •.3The bitterness or the Gennan teel~
ing ot rejection after the defeat or Eoo abated wi..th the
Q.coep'tfJS;r.lcftof Gernu~nY' into-NATO. However,; with1.n NATO it-
self &.nd soon within the nOj' issues evolved thit acted as
G we'dge be~ween Fra:nceandGe1'l'l1.an1_
l'Wl111e,251,. 2Ib1d ., 208.
)P:r,.noe and GepmQnyt~mQJor issues in. dlsputeif1 EOSO
we:red~lsc1"1m1natoryfre~gh~ rates, divergent tax sY$t~ms,
indus trialenterprlse,'agreenients and ownershlp-mm il:gemen t
concentrQtion,~ll ot.whlch the High Authorityfpcoqpuring
the economic rec-eS$ ion. 0'£195.3. F. ,RoY-Willis t~elits. these
problems in detail 1nhieohapter "lturopean:l.SM in Decline,
1954-1955" (ErtitTIQe, GermQrl;Y:, Q~dthe~;ewE~~Qp~).
When GenerQl de Oaulle returned 'to power in. 1958 QS
President of the ,FltthRepubllc, he dec1dedto use the
instruments of fiTATOand the Europefin Commun1tyto tux-tiler
his gOQl of:restoringl1"rance to Ii great pow~r position.
The Fourth Republl0 had nllilde only pilrtlal advanoes t(')ward
fulfilling the objeot:tvesoutlirled. by de Gaulle in 1945.
Through tb$ fr.nnewo.r-k ot the :ft1uroperm Com.rnunl:t.y it; had,' pro""
v1ded .th. bGS is tor French eoo.nomic :reco"er:y"~b'uthQd 'fQ 11~
en. to' supply FrQnce· sml11.t~.ry need, the barestbeglnning
hadibeen nuade to cres~eam111tarily Independent Ft-Qn(je •
A1 tbougb }f"'renQhmen bad beeniuuong the leaders otthfJ
t'wlotlo,nallst movement; the Fou~th RepUblic Is fnstabili. ty
ha.d not improved Frenoh. standing in other nations t e$t~em.
Itrema1ned for Gen$;tJflil de Gaulle to take action which
would ~a18e }4""rar10e to • position or world Influ.ence. Be..
tween 1956 arld 1'963 the Fed~:rQl RepUblic ot Germar.ry
.figured v 1. tallY' in It''renehpol1c1es whloh 8imed Qt recove:r-
!ngfor FrQnce the st.tus. of Q greQt powe%t;fully- inde.r.
pendent, a ~eade%' among the nations ot Europe .•
In Septembe:r 1958, ;}?r~81dent de Gaulle sent letters to
Brlt~1n and the Un:lted stQtes e,itpr~ss.1:ng his views on :NATO
QndFrs:noe's role in it. He Sfii,W NATO ».$ pasa~, ftu. struoture
formed to meet oonditions whioh no longer e.x.lst. tt to be
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useful, rnodlfleat1ons would have to be lll~de.l De G"ull~
m~de thr~e c~i tioisl&S of NAT<)t (l) th..- t importQnt de-
c 1s ions;\lJo;re Qll nUlae by the Un1 ted s'~,~teS(ln.~ Ore", tar1 taln I
JftJ%f .
(2) that the geographic $oope of l'~ATOwas too limlted,an,d
<) that Franoe did not r~c,elv'e a fQl~sha:r~,.of importQnt
p081t1ona :in the eomm~ndstruc:ture.2 In sho~t,.. to make
NATO aoeepta.ble to de afl1l11e, France would hav.e to l:>e.rully-
;recognized asa great power and treat~dQs such. This
would mean being consulted on Qll,Westernpol-l~i~s regsrd-
ingQny area or the wo~ld, r~c~lvlng AmerloQn fild11i8:C-
quiring ~n atomic stockpile <at lelitst to the txtento£
$uehi aid tloBri tam ).Ql'~d.being glvenmo:r~ and be'tter
p.ositlons in NATO· $ COD,1mllnd .tr~~ture.l A revamped I~ATO,
would have ~ .. directorate of the three states having .world..
wide resporAelb11i ties (United States; Groat. 13r~ta1int
Franoe), and eaoh otth$.s$ states would h&vea VQ.1c~1n the
employment ot nueleaZ'weapons. 2
Frenoh desires stated in .the 1958 letter$were r~­
Jeeted 'by-President Eisenhower and?rime HlnisterMaoIiJ.:tllm
RhdGerm».ny, .w1 thth¢'other NATO oountries, jo:tnfJdlti
cr1 tlo1sing )'ranoe' sstand.3 De Gaulle f s d~sir~. to extend
fl. ",. '
lFurnlss, f'rQnce Qnder 9c! Q~~lle, 10. 2Godrre~1, 128.
3Roy c. M~orid.1s~ndBel'r1Qrd E. BrOl'tl, The De Gtrulle
¥9E~~;1j2~~Ol1ie1ol)od • l111nob % The Dorsey l-'l'ess .'no••
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~!ATO's geogr.phlc· ecope w~s. not sh.re~ by most Germ,,-us
since Germany d1dnot have Franoe's oommitmentsabout the
.. 1globe.. Moreover" d,$ Gaulle t S proposed d1,:-eotox-.teo£fered
alpOS 1. tlon of equality to :£PrInee, but, not to Gerrnany,2
Such German opposition provided fJ, source ofdlsoord \vhic~
under4rn1n~:d efforts to lilonteve that 1JItranco-Germliln rapproohe-
ment so important to de GQulle's strategy for Europeuin
leadership.
BaJ:ked of atta1ni'ng z-ecogn1 tlon .8 ... ~reat power wi thin
NATO, de Gaulle took several itdd1t1onal ·steps. Until an
•.g:reement could be reaohed on France' 13 propos.ls tor re-
vamping NATO, France would host no missile 'bases, would
join no unified air defense, and would remove its fleet
from NATO cont.rol.) The American reaction in turn was to
place more emphaafs on Ge:rman contributions to J:.LATO; even-
tually le.ding. tQ to the very disruptive M-u.lt11ateral nu-
olear fo:rce disput, between France ind Germany. The more
France 'wi thdrew from INA.TO, the. stronger the mill tar,. ties
bet-ween the United States and Germany became. And oe1"tlinly
German'Y" s post tion as a dl'vlded na t1on, half-communist .nd
half-demoor~tle, guaranteed the loyalty of democrQtlo West
Germ~ny to NATO.4 As GermQn-Amerlcan bonds tightened,
------------_........._---.........- ........_-...... _-------
larosser, 510. 21b1d., 567.
3The Fourth Republic'had Rlso refused to urilfy ~lelr
t.11r defense. (Jt'u.rnl$$, Fr~nce 1!rQubled ~lll' 41.f.6).
4arosser, 570.
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Franco-German relations cooled. The fund9ment~1 German
premise was that the·~ecurlty of Berlin 18 linked to the
Phy51cal presence ot, American forces» on ·Germ.nsol1; with
Amerlcantroops on the :spot, ony attQck would lmmeditately
involve Americana and force the United St.tee ,to prompt
aotion. 1 Suoh. view is quite the oppo~lte of the well
known~Ggull18t desire to see Europe cleared of American
rorc~5.2
The military poliaies of Franoe and Germany drifted
further apart 8$. de Gaulle con tlnued the Fourth Republic t!
program of an independent nuclear foroe. On April 11, 1961
de Gaulle declared:
'~It 1. both the right and duty of the continental
European powers to h.ve their own national defense.
It i$ intoler.ble tor. great state to have its destiny
:!Subject to decisione and a.ct$ oS anoth.er at.te no
matter how friendly it may be." .
Though Germanyoould not be any more sure than Fr.nce
tha.t the United St.tee would risk retaliation from the Sov~t
Union by using atomic weapons In defense of Europe, she did
not follow de G.ullet~ lead, nor could ahe~ Germany seem8
1 Ib id., 16)..,._
2Raymond Aron m.ke~ the interelJting point that de Gaull,e
accepts the fact that West Germany hee to contin.ue to trust
in American security,; thu3 he oan count on G~rm.ny Qnd other
Europe~n ~111ee to' $oothe. American feelings, lea.ving him
free to ~peak independently without fe.~ of losing Americ.n
protec tion. ("Reading de Gaulle' e r1ind," ~ Republi£,
CXLlII May 4, 1963, 1213) •
.~
.... Hoffmann, 353.
~o p:rete:r deper.'dena." on the Un 1. ted' st,~ t..~s to dependence
on :Fri1tlce., if it OO!l'l~$ tQthat choice. 1 Preferubly she
wou1d not c.re to b.Tor¢ed to m.k~ tb~t aho1c~.2
Sinee de Ga.ulle' .~. l?eturn to power;·the Fl'"'~,nch have
ernphas,lzed nu.c'l&ar we.pone., sUbordinating c(t)nv~ntlon.l
forces to them. Gep~ral~,t/hlln~ ,Chief of the F¥~nehAl1"
FOl'..~.j expressed th'eb~lli:t that • thre.t of' r:,uc"le".:X-w~lWpons
ag":i'f,lstconv~r~tlor.t.iatt.ck. would oause" slowdown or even
e, stopping of the Att~:cl1.3 France o:r1tlclzed the growing
.::',','" "',c.'",.-",,-... .. ','.
Germanemphlls1s on oonvIJntlonalwe8pous and France has
o!,f;t~cized this not only-because it enlarged the German
!tH1.:11:t.rye~ tabllshmen~,but also beeaus. ltrepres~nted •
giv:tng wa'y to Am.rio-ii pre·ssure.4 The Amerioan"'Oerman-
Frenoh trlan.gi. ol1~be 1••1.1801: nd.11tarypolfcy 1sl. m. jor
$tu.rt1bling block 1n Fr.nd()~Germ..n relat1oDe&'. Al though
deG,ull. ha.s refu,se¢! tooomprol1tlse his stmd on NA':PO, he
does not wish GermanY' to think that he rejeots the pX'inoiple
of the Atlantj.c .111ance.· In May 1962; at I- pr~ss confezl -
ene., he r ••. r:Pirmedh1s b~llef in that pri:ne.tple~ .ssuring
his allies th.t.
"So long as tllt Soviets i;hreaten thel.vor~ld, this
alllance must be m.1ntalned~ 'France ls.n Int&gril part
--_.-...........'-"'"'-"'--"-------..-......'_..............~.._.----_.,,~~ .......
lGroaser, $68. 2EPstelnj 58•
.3Anthony Verriel'JtfFr~neh md West German strategic
Thinking;» tIl!:.! trJ0:r~l:1 'l'odll, XIX (J'une i 1963), 236."
4Ib1d., 235.
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of it. If the fp•• wo:rld were attacked on the old or
the new C9ntinen t, -Frllno.would tak@ part in the COltll'llOn
detel1$ft aX the sid.so! her .111'8, wi.'Ch all the means
she his." "
De G~ulltJ vle-wsthe ttapproehement which he wishes to
.ncoul".ge between FrfHlce and Germ._ny primarily to further
Fr-.,nch national inter.'ats.The alos.x- the F'ranco-G0rm.arJ.
ties,the eGsler it :fsforJ"raflce tach.ok It rising Gerrrum
powe~;. As early as 1957,., Kurt Si.v~kl:ng,. preslden t of the
Bundesrat', deal.e,reCit
It 1s $videtlt. that Germany will b~come.ev~rmor.
,th. natural nuc161.lsot crystal11satlonfor Europ.. • •
• It must b~ m.d~.apsolut.ly 01...1' that. •• this..
. '. 1s t th. t1rst~,~v~Xlt of :fi;urope.'
'With G~rm.n aupP'C))iltF;r-lno. wou.ld b. in •• good poat tlon
to lead the Europea.nQommuni ty .long the pa,th$of French
pbliey. The Comnl'un1tlwo~:.td httlp France become agp••t in-
dustrial pow&r. Indu'tp;i~l might was vit-Ito plaoing Frane.
in th. front rank ofri~ti.dns. It Bonn couldbepersu.ded
to .?cept Fr'ench nucl••r p6w.r in place of Artier-loan, F'ranoe
could tither ro~ce th.1>rATO :revisions she d.$ir~d or .:rr.et-
.... ~-'.". ',' "." .'. :--'
iVl"ly destroy:NATO b1;\,~.i,ktng out of NATO w1'th Germttn'l.
As the leader Or"~;\1r():B., France could claim tht ;resouroes
of*-lmoat h.lfan industz-l 611 continen.t to h81p her st.nd as
• third force b,tw••n the two world power bloos. Prosident
___________""'- ....._'.*_'_t_.·._, ......~~-~ ..........~~
. lFrench E;;mbIlSSY, Pr~s$ and InfO:I*rnatlon Division, 'I'he
First Flve Y••rsoftn.~F1-ttA a.Eubll~:.2! li'r.no,~,(N.w-YOrk:
Fv.noh~llssy, lC}04-r;-17.
2Kar1 w. neu tsch ~nd L$w1s J. Edinger, G.~m.n:y' ~!join}!
the Powers, (~rtanford: Statnford Univers:1 ty :Pres 8, 19~9),
~.- -
d. Gaull. openly decl.,r.d~his intention:
I lrl:tend to "persuad. the st. t.s to form .. poll t-
leal,_ .conomic, jii'gS;pat.gia blo'Q; to 8staPlish this
organization bet~".n~be Soviet and th. Anglo... /nner1o,n
camps.l» .'
A F:renoh o~1.n te<,iW'e8t aorml,ny might eVen 8ncou~.g.
East European.s tt> loosen. tleswi"th the Soviet Union ;rod b.
drawn westward bee-us.' they would no longerr••r an arrned
,nd un! ted Germany. 2
Itw•• fortunate torP:resld.nt d. Gaulle that th;$ h••d
ot, th.'tideral a.pUblic of Germany, Ohancellor Adenauer,
also desired I rappro(jh.ment. Adfbnaue:r wlsheda reoona111-
a t10n wi thPr.tloe IlsI)artof his basio po11(ry' of 8S t$b11sh.
ip@ conf1.dculce in Ge:rnUlny- by firm.ly .llylng he!' wlththe
"'has t.,.3 Th1"Qugh a PO$~;,i~o#ot power ga1netd by' •.11gn1ng her-
solf wi ththe West, ae,rmany would be in;',. posltlonto :nego-
tiate for ':reunification. The burying ot the longst•.nd1ng
:Frarlco"'G~:rroan r(tud WIUS to b. the foundation ,or tnew progress-
lveEurop••4 a.n.rlt~,f()t'W.8t Germany would'1nelud.~eon­
omio advantages throu~hth. Community and .. usefulallianee
in case of an Am.r10.n ...Sovl~t accord oVer the, question of
G.rman unifioation.'
laa,.ns Joachim Morg.nth.u~ "Four Designs tor Tomorrow" s
Europe", Th. !!!! YorkT1m.s.~.g.z1n. (MI." 17, 1964), 18.
20odtrey, 1)0. .3Ar~n, 164. 4Epste1n.58.
'Allin S. 'Nan.a, lttW.$.t G_;rman Foliey in W.st Europe,"
OurZ'ent Hlatorl., XLIV (April, 1963), 21$0.
'Durin.g tn. first years or d. Gaulle' sachnlnietratlO'n
F):~noo...G.;r.man .ru~~ordp.rosr.!H1UU~d tHJtterlot·orl1y. Tb. 1958
I,ppolntnt*nt ot t~,.ur1c.. d. (-tou". de ~/ltU'f~1.1.ltt" ·thon 1('r~A'o:h
,p;mbas$ador, to German1••s l~or.l~ l/sJ.n1etlltr w,sftn auspioious
g~$ttl~.. Jh'19n~u"v took! t .. 8 a good orA~~h1 Af't.x- tll. first
m••tln@~ ot Adenauer .-f:l" d. a1ful:l.) it 'b1iHH,m~ ol4t_~r tb"t thfll
two h••de ota't.teshtr_dmutual .dm!'ratlon ror .ach other
'as1Jell •. $ In .w.~cen"·$~ o'fth. adval1 tagea ot F1"'ilineo-(~h~p[ft"n
oooper.tion.2 f:'tconomlc In,t..,gJ?atlon adV.llo_d -lrnost .uto-.
m.t.1c~lll. By 19$8 tl1••arly dlspute'$ w1 thin Re,se wor.
t.tlt1oo to upbQldth.T'~fl.,tl cr aom.md1rrjI,1~'mt.ntth.
tlotmton ,~:~A:rk.t _.3 Dlplomati('fall1., '&rif/; Frenoh pres ld.nt t 5
eupp().rt of 'th.G.rm.r~po.lt10tl tn S..r11n and his oompll..
mtt11tat'1 sp••eh.s publlefilly pr.l",lng Germany and ;'d.n~u.r
contrrlbuted to 1rnprot'lng ~.l.tlo-n. b.tw••n the two countrl.s.4
Tholl' tt8p!)J'ocrulfm.llt waa cll!~x.d b1 .n «Yxcha't"4g. 0,t vflr1
s~.lce~88tu18t.t& "lett. in 1962.
80 successful w.:r. tb. 1962 tttatt: vlsltm thl·t French
trod O.rman aoe1,,11at p.rtl.sbaoe::nf< alltl't'fted enough to issue
• j01tlt -w4l:rnine;. 1'hey r •• r.d, th-t the r~cono111.t!on was
1W11118, 276. 2notftnfUTo. 34"'.
~W.ltfU~.Zt.hl (ed.), ,Ii!\t !rQ11.tlce off'oa t~..r .9!!rrt)!t..r~X
rork: Freder!(fk cA. t':c••ger, Ina.,L9m;
4\/111118, 294.
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becoming an allianoe b.tw••ntwo n.,t1on.11sms.~ .1m~d at ..
P.Iris-Bonn •."-is which would dom!nllt. an integra,ted Europ_.
Insp1te of Ad.nllu(l)r*s,h.'tt.uj d.n1•. 1~; which appflllr.d in
Chrlatund ~.lt on S.pt.:mb.r 14. 1962,d. a•.ull.' s consis-
ten.t rejection of supran.tio:nalisffi lent 8u'bsta:nc. to th.'
chll,rg_. W'ith.out th.$upr••n.tlon.l.8p.ct~ th.Oomr.uunl ty
W'J, uldb. lim! t.d to depending on t~..d1 t1.ooa1 na tionaloo-
oper.t1on,l The Franoo-German .Tr•• ty or 1963 w•• oritic-
ized by sonte Gorman Qpponen,ta pr.ci,s.ly on the grounds
that 1t e.nteredon a Bonn-P.r1s •.111ane.inst••d of the
unity 01:' theS1x. 2 It "".8 to b. th. m••neot 'otun..ntlng the
Fr4ehoh-G'erman rela tlonshlp through c10,$. cooperation. Wh.
h••ds of gov.rnment m... t at l ••ost tw10e • y.ar. th. d.r.nm.
ministers every thr•• months, th. ohi-fa of staff every two
months. These 001'ls'ultat1ohS (lOV'lr fore1gn • .rraJ..lts, d.t~ne.j
.oonomic • .fforta,youth and eduoation..) a.oeptionot' the
tr••,ty WA. divldtd.lxl F:rana., th. Ootrmlunl$ts a-lied 1t
'''~.m.gogu.ryn, th. Socialists clalm.d it Was tn.••ningless
UJ,'11sss d. GaUlle controll.d both Frane. and Germany, and
th. mod_rat.a d.ploredit ... 8 bae.d on .. bre.k with Britain
lind the Unit.d Stat.s,,4'
lFurnlasj Franc.! Un~.;- s!! G.ull.
p
' 49. 2Wil11sj 312.
~1.Jclm ,Faokl.r. ttThe p'ranoo-O.rma,Il Tr•• ty: the .nd of
hereditary .mnlty,~ World Tod8l, XXI (Jlnu8ry, 1965), 28,
4Wl111s, 34.
3Wl111s, 309.
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Adonlluer _,nd the men who su.pport_a hiI'll wore llbled
German aaulllsts. It,14a$ proof of the high pr10rltythllt
Adenauer placed on good Fr.n.oh rttl.tions that h. rat_d th.
treaty abov. B:rlt..in 'e .n~ry 1nt,o EEC. fl. looked on th.·
,~
.c,cord as • m••nsof'pr-aerving'lth., rapprochltment wlthFranee
. )
pa.st the time wh.n h.wouldturn the ottice ot' ohanc'el1or
over to someone els••,1 But the rujorltY' ot aerm.n opinion
w,e:s<)pposed. EEe CommiastQn Pr.e1dtnt Hallst.• in claimed
Ita~bot.g.d th.splrlt ot' the Treaty of Ro~. by" fts·'bl-
llt-ral natur. rath.r$ban USillg' th. Oommun~ty fr.un"work.2
, . • .
,Th. French veto of Brlt'·l~ ,took placo only &w••k b.fore
Ad.tllu.r* s visit to F.rls·~~.nd th. aerman chanc,.11orrC9c,,1v.d
shat:p eritlclsxrl ,r:or signing th- tre.ty i.n· th_ r.ce ot,
F;'-'at1oe' s r~ j .:0 tlon otl~1'1t.:ln.3 'lb.. tv.at,.· W.~8 only-rat t1-
fj,edbec.tuiJ. 1. t eouldb'us.d as • mod.l for-mult11.teI'al
coop.ration with oth_x- eo'Ul'ltr18s.4 B.tor.-AOoepting,it,
t-h.G.rmans add_d It pr••rtlbl. which oall-d tor clos.
co(;rp.r.tlon b"tw••n tb.Unit.d st. tes and Europo, ,corrmlon
d.r.nsa in NATO withlnt_gration or member,. arm.dforces,
end unification ot Europ••long Commun1ts,. lines, including
th••ntranc. of Gr.at B:rit6n. Thus th. Bund.svat sp.l1od
1 '. 2 ',"F.ckl.~, 26.- Willis, 312.
4Alfred Grauer, The Federd ae~Ubl,lC .2.!,.Ge:rmllnz
(N.wYorkt Frederick A." Pr••ger, 19 4), 120,
3q
out th. issults W:11oh divided ~TJ.nc. and Oerrru"ny in the very
op.ning lin.s of II treaty-meant to 'symboliz. olos. oooper...
• tlon. 1
The terms or nhatr•• ty are being o.rri.dout. Th.
for_lgn arfairs conferences b..v. tak.n :place as perscrlb.d
but not much in th. w.y of oommon pOlioy has resulted.
PrGsidentd. G.ulle t s crt tleisttl of NATO 1l1,sunde:rmlned ohances
or olos.:r,' d.r.na. po11oy.2 Only in th••rel of youth and
_duoa'tlon h.$ there b.en what could b- o.ll.d eucc.ss. On-
evldtne. of thl8 success 1s th. rae t that in 196'+ ov.r
279,000 youth.s hav_ crossed 1m. tront1.ra both wliys. But
art.r six months. ev.n d. GaUlle" when sp••klng o:f tn. t:r••. ty,
acknowl.dged that "this proj.at, .v.ryone knows, has not
oom. to anything. f~.)
Th. ..rly ',"1 ft lira that h.ld sO much hope fot' Franco-
G_rman diplonlllcy look.d just as .ncourliging for th. Europ••n
Eoonomic Oommunity. Living up to 1ts .arly' promis., th.ttEC
acted •. s • stimulus to eoonoll11c growth in, France and Germany.
a.tw••n 1958 and 1962 Germ.lln industrial prod'Uotion climb.d
35" and P'rench 2.3%_ Fr.nch and German trad_ wi th Oommol1
'M"rk.t partn.ra do~bl.d.. whil. Fr.noO.,;.aermlin trade tlltrloet
tr1pl~d. Oollaboration betw••n Frenoh and a.:rman industry.
t.king th. form 08 lic.rlsing agr.,nu@lrd;s, mark_tins; _gr••mente,
~~,.,...-- ~~-"""""--'....._------
lw111iS, 313.'
.lind joint 8ubaidiarl.e, markedly Incr~.s.d.;.l German rai th
in Fr~neh ll'ltontlons to l1v. up to th. 't~rms of the ~'1'.Ulty
of .Horn.e r~c.iV8d Q boost during EEC's tiret YOQr by P'r4inee '8
m~kingsaerlfie.s to m•• t th. first tariff de&dll11.. In
order to m•• t th. schedul.d 10% tariff'r.duotion for all Em
oountriea by Januery 1.. 1959,radic4ileconornle r",forms were
r_quired in F1rsno_. D. Gaulle m.t this n••d by d.v~1'UQt1:ng
the .franc, r$nJ.ovi-ng quotss on 90% of Fr~nc.ts imports" from
OEECeountrifls, In¢r... slng taxea, euttltlg ex.penditures; &rid
1.ow.rlngsoc1Ql security paym.nts.,2 Ind••d, iiu:fu.r.-nce to
the Common Msrket s.~m.d to signify thQt Franc. was _rlding
QtrQdition ore-nti_ring her 1ntec;rnatlonal economic policies
. on domestIc pX'-otection!sm. Most of: the opposltiontoEEC
cQm.rJ:'onl indus-trt.ssuch a$ th. Frenoh textil. industry
that feared comp.tit1on~1th other Oornmun1 t1 nQtlorls Qftor
tariff reduotions came Into .rract. Eneour$lge1.ngly, th_
EEe justifi.d lts.lf to th. Pronch textil. industry by show-
ing ., jump in 1ta px-oduotlon ind-x from 95 in 11,59 to 118 in
1963, using 1958 a8 a bas. YltaX' of 100.3
Although friotions :tn:Uo ox1sted from the start, they
did not becom. evident until th. oommuni ty was WCtll under"-
wfil.y .. " OVl»rt ditrerenc.s I1PPfHU".d on li1Qtt~rs of tariff r ...
duotlon, common ,,-griau.ltu,rQl pollcy, politic&ll unlon~ and
m.mb~rship for Grlturt Bl."l tQ1n .}.f.. HQvlng b••n refused a rr••
---~--------------------,--------.......-..---,----
lWl11iS, 2e.l. 2!~~q.,2-78. 4Ibid ., 282.
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zon. wlthEEC memb.,rs, Brit&lln org4l,ulzed th. Eur"OpeiUl Fr••
Trade AssociGtlon (EFTA) with D~nm~rk, Horwsy'" Swed.n,
Austria, Portugal, Qnd SwitzerlQnd to COInl;H.to wi thEE~O. To
nl&et this ch9,11enge ]~1~C d.cid.ed to acoererQt. its't~rift
reg.D.c·tions. Fr~nc. favo:r*d this step; aermany, slwQYs a••k-
ing wider n18rk.ts, 0pPQsedi t~ in the .ndtth.y oompttomised.1
HQ.d not the 1nteriortarifts b ••n roduc.d and it cprnmon .x-
t.r'fo:r tQr~ifr b.lJlu agr••dupon, EFTA might ha"'. 'had'" great...
,_r"tl?Rding QdVanitage toott.r WI1t$t Germany thatl th. Oom~
:munlty,. In that! 81 tu~,~'j,()n the F.d..ralaepUb.l,!oml,ght'w.l1
hRY,'., ,bel&o drawn :to 8e:Los.~ aeoord with Britain. Ins~.Qd
.rlo;ti~h to prevent OorlTlanl b.lng led aatr81 h1Br1t,all1.2
. :~" ..-: :'; , : " :, ' ': ~.":' -' . -. - - '. - ',', ' '
, The EFTA d1s0ord,-·'h>1~light.d th. d:t:ft.r~ntplin$ f~vor$d
by Fps:rlce and G.rmtiny. Wll,. h.neh endors.d c8.r.ful /plann-
In.g;~ndd.v.lopm.nt wi 'chIn:< the S1x) and opposed th. c'ompllc-
$itlons brought on bY' Iherejs1ng th. s1z.otthe Community.
ErhQrd,as SpOk.Sll'UUl ofthi Oarman .oonomlc group. 1"0 j.ct~d
tight plQnning AS Cornrn:uni$tio and boclli.ua. 1t sh.ut Sri tleh
. .
and Amer1canxnark.ts toG.:rman goode.) H. &".n us_dsuch
terms .$ ·'Europ.4ln incest" a.nd tt.oonomic absurdi ties'· to
describe th. French m•.rk,ting outloOk.4
rLlbld., 286.
-3Gro EHiflr, "Franoellnd G~rnlanY',u 572.
J"'Wolfe tv. Schms,k01, ftaftrmfl.ny ~ndth. nommon
Curr.nt Histor:y, XLV (Nov.mber, 1963), 285.
.J3
Proba,bl:r the moe t difriettlt ~conomlc stum.bling block
in F:E1C was th.., oommon9_griculturQlpollcy, th. 'lUllS tfo:r
which b$g~n in Januat·Y' 1962.1 Wi th .IDQst G.;.rnl~.ny (th.
natur-a.l proouc.x- or ~gricultur~l p:rodu~cts I·or West o-.,~m~ny)
cut off,France- $ surplusasrioul tU!'lil.l produce would find
a natural !nark.t in food~d.tiol.nt irJ$$t a.rtrlQny. But
GellmSiny's l.ss .rf1ci.nt tarnl popul,tlon enjoy.d a pro-
tected position in ih. West C.h,rmQrt economy. 'This prot.otlon
was due to' the powerful voice or tht farm vote. Both '~T~no.
md Ge:rmany had *stabllsh.d .l.bo~at. subsidy systems
d.licllt.ly balanc.d tneaoh country's itlt.rn~l *conomy. In
ord.r to enable EEe to begin its s_ooxld stag. on tim8 in
January 1962, G.rmGny made tn.jar oone.salone in agriculture,
doing away with quotas, govern.mc.nt stoc,t(piles, tUld national
tariff bQrri-rs j.n ct:r.als. Po~k,••ggs Qnd poultry W8re to
b. p:rotetlted by 1.v1.s and ~ minimum prioe whlch w~rfl! tifJQ
to th*, c-r",g,ls agr••m.nt~ Anoth.-:r agricultural sa,cri-
fie. Gft;rnumy mAd. WQ8 Qn8.grcunnent to op.~ <llJOtliS ,for wilute
to tl'U.mbor st~t.s. The other mtlmb_rs or n:mc r.eogniz&d the
eoa t of thcrr contributions whieh a,,:rmany was milk ing and 88
Q. rl'isul t th-y too wore willing to n'J,fik. eOl1.c_ssiOllS whioh
would.•58. th6 organlzat1on t $ progr.ss. 2
~h.r. were pollt1c.al ditf.ren(HIS as w~ll 88 .oon.om1c
on.a. Although the EEC had only b.g~~ funotionll1g in 1958,
r~d.r4)l,11st groups soon urged a oombinat1on of the High
Author! ty 'wi th the Oommissions of l1lura tom tmd 'BEe iind th.
direot -l.ctlon of th_Europ.litl1 I~&rllam.nt.1In the f€itco
otth1st.ndency th. President of th. FlfthRepublic mad.
cl.~rh. could n.ot 8.0cept anything that woUld :tntring. on
, ,
'r-Ilobnil tlonal sov4r.lgnt,. Instead, in Octob.r 1~~9 i
P:r,m1.r Michel Deb.t*'sugg.$hd that th..' 81xllold p.r-fbdl0
¢onit".r.notls' on poll tic,l nil. tt.rs and. $stllbJ.+sha pol.t~loQl
. ';,',
$.~~it.:rl·at in Pa'r1s t ,;·Although th. EECt paI'~n.~s' wj,r*sus-
I11~¥#uS 91' 1m athmpt\'~~7~d.rll!ln. th41 COIllln~l.ty:, s u1~img t.
go.~}or ~11mlt.d tun(it1Ql'~8)':but r.al pow.rs,'f,tht,. Qgr~,d to
q);1i##,,~J.Y Ill..t ing.. (> t t()~.lgn min.1i!lhl'l!l .to1',oonl!lu~'t;~t;:1on
on ;:~t:~l1'lgn po11el.2
, . -
'Xh.: po11 tloa.l 1$,~.::"~fl:$ not an 1tern ofmomel1td1Jn1ng
1Il;l,.l'!rost stag. of ~'(£~*8"'1962)i but th.l'•. wllll nodouot
of~b..p.d. Gaull. stoQd'rigard1ng 1t. In at't-lev'1$_d
8p.-~'¢h t.ri tJI-.y 1960, h.~<bll1.1.(l foxt .. w.s,~.rn.Etu:-op.Qn,Unlon
".;',;,'V ". ", " :.;, ,. :
Qsjn 'f imposing conf.ao'vaAJ1,on" which 'W()ul,~ b 91.nce }f;listem
Europe tand. male_ possibl,•.aEurop.an .nt.nt*.'f.fromt-h.
tctliirltif)- to th. U2'9,1$_" In. JurJ,e otthtt yefi1r·,Debr'.x-
plAlltl.dthat hanc.eU.driot cons1d.r meJ?ging, the Comrnunity
4Jxecu.tj.v4tS nec.ssary,sinc. Qnly gov.rtltlHitntooop.rtii tion
W4fS ntHtd.ed. 3 Th. Freneh governm..nt co:n,sidered the present
Community structur. tight enough ~rld any further cohesion
4 .. ,- ~......-~
n••ded could come frolnr.glilar gov'ftrnm.nt chann-ls. A
th1.:rd tim. in th. saUlS yflar,.t his September $pttoas eon-
t.j.nc., d. Gault. lnad.el«uIP tihat h1svision of unlt_d
E:ut';o.p. w.sbas.d on sOvor-olgn st~t.s" not a sU'pranatlonal
community,l
.N' ev.~tl'+.l.ss, in ap1t- of d. Gaulle' a dIsapproval,
v.:ritious proposi,ls torf\1ttther1ng poll tiC8l 1nt~gra1;lon were
mad.. to th- Study" Commlssl,on .atilo11shed b9~P;O. As the
Oomm.on f-iarket mov.d. intOfts El4tcondph$,se, cone.mav.r its
d.Y.loptrJ.~nt b.esm. rnor••out,. The Fr.nch gov.rnm.nt
;$u.ggoat*d tht formation or a council of h.,.dtJofstat. having
powo:rswhleh would reduOsthe rol. of theOommul'llty Ass.m-
bly. l~aul..H.nrl $paQkof Belgium. :vtj_oted this proposal
19n(ionoa mor- urg.d t'h.ftl.rg~r of •.x.outiv.-e. 2 Thelssua
,nd.d. in d••dlock in th*,March 1962 m••t~n8·Or for.lgn
m1nist.rs.
Another difficult is!ru. on the study OOrnmiss1on t s
~.g.hd. was th. problem ofEri t1sh -m.m'bereh1.p in EFJO .•
In July 1~61,Prl:m. ~tlnl$t..r Harold»-iaamil'1an '.n"
. ." . . .
nouno.d the Gp,n1ng ot'll.gotiat1ons torSrltlsh.ntr1 'into
E:gO, .which th. EECCommlsslon gr•• tttd war-rol" Th.N~th.·r­
langsj B'lgltun. Luxembouvg, Qnd Italy .sp.cielly w.lcomcd ..
pot,.ntlijl count.rbalsnc.to a Bonn-Pltr1a axis; and Gormany
w~s »180 plm~s.d at th. prospoct of Britain joining :REO.
119M _, 295.
It would b. Iii further consolidation' o.fth. W.stern ~llianc.
a,nd pr8se,nt » mor~ solidly tthi t.d west.rn, .front to the Sov1.t
U:nio.n.• 1 G,.rrn~ny alr~.dyh~d .. eonslder.:bl••mount oftrad.
with Sri tr;1n end this move would .nl;,J;'g_ tha.t mar:ket .v.n
mor., Co.mp.tl tion with EiFTA WQuld end Qnd most of its
rorm.r membars would' become _ssoeiat. m.mb~rs or EE:C tnus
providing Y'fttw1dermarkets. 2 Pr.nc. b.Qwev$r was 1*88 en...
thu.slastio sino. she was not 1ntfU'Jest.d in trsdewi thth.
British Commonwealth and f.lt she hId littla to gain from
aca~pti:ng EFTA memb.rs &,sJ!rEC associates'. N.verthelsss,
Is negotl&tlons w.ro .bout to begin, President d. Gaulle
stat-a that h. had Ualwfiys dos1red that others, Qnd G:r••. t
Bri tftin in pAlrt1eul",r', .OC1Jpt the Tr.aty. of Rome. tt,3
By October 1961,- .8 negotiations tor British entry to
FUOO beg8n to tak. rorrn,the numb4rr of concessions n••ded
tOilccomodat. the probl"ms ofConmlQnw.fal thtrl.de b.c,une
I,ppillrent, Sargaining continuod into »1.1 1962 wh.nth.
serious hurdle of th. stand.l'd.s und.r whioh t.xuperat.
t"ood$tuffs would .nt_r the Oornmon' 1'1ar'ket, wh.r. they could
cOnlp.te w'i th French produce_, wa.. taek16d;this problem r.-
mtllned unsolved.4From Ootober to Dec"unbar 1962, ntttgotl-
.,tiona dealing with d:tr.otBr:1tlsh sUb$ldl~s and gUtirsnt••d
"'--,"',......, ---------,..-""----_.~.--""'----,-----.,...."
lTerencGJ Pritt!., nTh. P_rie-Bonn A.Xis, ~.w 116pUb!.!,£,
eXLII! (Fobru.ary, 1963), 9.
2Willls.. 300. 3Ibid., 307. !~~biq., 301.
p;rtic.$ iti Qgrioul ture v ls"'!,l-vis the ElSe corrtmon a.grioultura,l
poltQyb$o1Jme d.adlock.d,which rH"e.ssi,t~ttid th...ppoint-
mst1t of a faot find1l'lg oom11iitt•• ) ;)ut Prfts,1d_nt d« Gaulle
, put an end to th. discussion wh.n he announced to • press
conferano_ on J~.nua:ry 14, 196.3, that" in his view, B!'itain
w&lsnot r®ady for entry into lEO and in fact did not fit
into the' Europ.an pictur_. A,w••k'lat.r,Frano. moved tbat
, 1
,n.got1Rtlons tor Sri t • .1n t $ adxn1ttanoe to EEO b••ndtd.
I'
~j,. F;renoh baX'rlng of Sri t.1n from E~1J bad Ilv1.o1 ..nt
.rr.at on Franco--Germah rel,tions. :publlc 9plnlon polla
in Germany reflect.dth.dx*as'tiechange 1n G_rman f ••lings,
German raltot1on to Fr.nch for.lgn poliey' dropp.d from 61%
:ravorable in. Oetc.fb.r1962 ,to 38~ in l~ov·.mb.r 1963~2
attrma.ns .r*lt InEfult.d that th. Fr.nQh pr.al,~.nt h3d not
w._lt~d even on. w.ek, th. tim. that the C;.rman chancellor
would b- inPa:rls toslgn th. Tr•• tf of 19~';, to oonsult
'hinlon ,. illatter of: such 1mport.nt mutu.al Int'..;r.st. There
the:re was bitter r.s.ntment against Ad.nau.x-forhavlrig
signed .. treaty in th. t ..~~ of d. Gaulle t:l indepond.nt
action which $ ••mod a betrayal or th. spirit of consul-
t.tton tn. tr•• ty was supposed to r.pr,.s.n t. As1d8 from
th.ttl. tt.r or national prl<i_. Gertllan businessm.n and in-
dustr1ltllsts b,118>v-.d tha~ Ft-~no$ had d~prlv.d thom ot th•
• conotnie advantQg.s otBri.tish •.nd Oonm1onw.~lthmark.ts.
,. '.1sAW
l~Nillis, 302.
Wha.t caused de Gaulle to deal such e blow to' his care-
.fully nurtured Franoo..,Garman rapprochement? The safeguard-
ingot French agrictlltural lntereets was not the only,; not
even the pr lmar-y, res.son for )'trance ' s re ject10n of Bl'i taln ..
De Gaulle did not wish to see Great Bri taln in JJ;EC because
Br1ta1nwould be a way tor the United states to In.fluenc&
and possibly threaten European independenoe, His sus-
.p1cions ot American plans to use Br1tain as a Trojan
horse were aroused by the assurance given by President
Kennedy to Prime .Minister" Macmillan thattbe "speoial
relationship" between Brltal11 and the United states would
not" be changed.1 The United states thought thttt Brit&~n
would glveEEO greaterstab111tYt an Atlantic outlook, end
a pos! tlol'l more in line w1thAlner1can views on m.aJor issues.2 .
Press releases, such 88 the fQllowl:ng, convincingly implied
that the Un1ted States 1n tended to use Sri ta.fn 8S 8 mad.!a to
dominate the Oommunity:
A Plurope oxYganlzed wi'thout the United States would be
a Europe organized agairlst the United states. This 18
why Weare push1ngbard tor joining the Common l~larket.
• • •. We njed Britain as a broker end to ensure an
open door. . . .
It 1s likely that de Gaulle did n.ot want Britain to enter
the Common plarket as a .full member during 1ta forma tlve
lMa~ ~~loft, The Unite4 S~.tee and the Unlp: of ~f:\ro£!
(Washington, D.a.:'he 13rookIngs InStItutIon, 96J), 101.
2Ibid • 3Ibid • 109.
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political per1.od. Only atte;r Franoe has been able to shape
and set the form of El00 W01.l1d S:x-i ctls.h. entr&noe be feas.able
-for de Gaulle. 5.1nee the co~~ of the vJe$tEuropean unif'io-
atlon was to be Bonn and paris, de Gaulle would prefer not
toh$ve aaompetl tor -of: equal strength to balecnoeli"'ranee
wi thin the commun1 tYt·1
. "
-,
ot cou:r'se there were more factors in the oooling
Fre.noo-Germao relations than the Frenchretusal to allow
Britain to enterEEC. Ii. new chancellor began leading the
Federal Germerl RepUbllopo11oy a:nd placing emphasis. on
othe~ goals, Even greater divergencies or-policy were
develop1ng in BEe and NATO. 'rench natlon$llsm found tm
echo: in Germany, and-Sonnano. paris developed different
piotures ot Mosoow•
.The first conferenoe between Pves1d.entde Gaulle and
Ch$~cel1or 1P.1rhard in July 1964 wal notausploious. ~he
:Freri'oh president announc'$clthat they had sp<>k:erf with "ex-
treme rranKrlSss", and1t\iuis leaked to the p~~ss that
de G$ulleorlt101.edE~hard·s support ot theArtle:r-1oti~polioy
in '-~~uthea$1'; Asia .1~on:.lder1ngErhard' $- statements in the
Bund~et'e.t in October 196j~$ ooolness betweerithe two heads
I
ot state was not surprisIng. tt.The security of the Federal
. -
German .Republic can be guaranteed only through NATO;w1th
thecooperatlon at OUJ:'Eu~0peQn end Noz-th Ame'rioan pB.%'tners
1nboth poll tical and military fields,·l he had stst'ed.
1~ak1ngeV'en moredefln1teWes~German comm1 tment to the
Uhlt~d States, Erharddeelared thet h1sgovernment .would
con.tinue nto decide al1qu~stl()ns or common- interest in
I
close and friendly eonsultatio!l with t:q.e Ame:r1can govern-
ment; n he 8.1so vJ:tshed to reopen r:.egotlatlo:ns for Brltl$h
:4tpinoers on h"rhard, rt The r~conomi8t,OOXII (July 11, 1964),
132.
4~,:
Entry into EEe, and to work tor a "wider Co111tUunity.ul
'Ear,liar dltferenQ,6~within rJA'I'O had. not $bated by
196,3, and it was madecle~:rthat F;ranoe w8a1n the process
ofwlthdrawal. De Gaqlle predicted tl?-at; by 1969, ttWe shall
end the subordination that is described 'as il1t$gpatlon,
whioh 1sp;ro,v1dedfQ.l:t 1.>y W'.A110 and whic~ put$OUI' dest;lnl
:i.ntne hands ,ot .fo~elgner$...2 To th, contrary. the Federal
Germ.an a.publio l'¢newe<.i its 1018.11;1 tQ NATO and this added
to the Frenoo-(le;rman l"lt~, For eXQmple. Erhard accepted
the ML!'''3 ,s a means to further Germarf md,.litary l:nteg,ra,tlon
intoth..e Atlantic alliance, e,ven though., suoh integration
w.Qs a direot blow to de GaUlle fa vi .i,on of an independent
Europe.4 It did not wQrtnrelatlons between thelrtwQ
c01xntries when tiPhard.ennounced that while he ttraspeot$u
th.e French n"uolear tore~.he "feels more 8Jecu~e~' under
the Amari (Uln • S
As Bonn fottg$(l etronger bonds between West Germ.fffiY
and the Un! ted Statesbysueh linksaa ML'I de- Gaulle de-
olded to ule E~EO •• one means of applying pr5Seure on Erhard,
.,...,.,.,.
:lW111is_ 316.
2ttDe Gaulle.8 }{:urope," Am~r1ea,OCIII (8epternber 25;
196~) I. 308.
3f1iLF represents multilateral nuclear force, &. .fleet of
surfaoe ships arl'rlEtd wit'hpola:rl $ missiles and operated by
mixed~m&lned orews from NATO oountries. (Willis, 321).
4"The Oeneral Picks. His Sattlefield l " The Economist,
OCXIII(N'ovember 7" 1964>, 592. _. ·
5... "...1.... lrold Him" rrhe 1'1eonom1st.... CC!X (December 7; 1963.1,997,·' , ---"
pa~t1eularly through the issue or grain prioes. l Always
a thorny problem, agricultural policy was the first major
hitch in EECafter Erhard took o£.flc.~. De Gllul1e wIshed
to have a solid i'·uropean agricultural fI·ont to present to
the UnIted States at the Kennedy FtOUIld of Tariff negotl~
stions which waa 5ch$duled foX' spring 1964. 2 P:rogress on
reaching EEe agreements on agrioultural products was slow
during the summer of 1963. In October 1963 Q French ul-
timatum demanded t~t 8. d~ciB1on be madf) or FX-aIlce would
qu~tEEC. F'1ns.lly 1n December. 1963 some mutual ooncessions
permitted a common po.llcy-to be drawn up lnbeef; milk
p:rociuets'Qnd r1ibe, buto,(t;t.·:tal deo1elons wer$ posiipori$Q
until April 1964. The aooord reaohed on 'beef and1'rll),.k pro-
dup;C'j 1s more significant When it 1s l'ea112HJd ,~hJlt,,:pro­
duets have more va~u.,:·~:c!: .'~re.ter produetlontn.an all·'the
'., -'. -";.;' ':',.': ,.:",.-" ."-:':,',:.,::,'
CottlmdnMarket 1 a mfjtal~o:rltl~g industriaa. i:nc,ludlng 8nip.
bulldina, and 'l'u tomobl1e'rtta#ufac 'Cur1ng. JanUtx~y··1_1970
We.~'l,~e'ba8 thetQrgetq~te by wh1ch ell' prioe's t46uldbe
(jl1.~ed. Arriving at'. GC6trbon price, a specific taX'g'et
da.te and the meat!. to ach.lev$ that goal requires slow and
palti~taking negot 1&tiona. However. France $a.sued I).nother
\f±c~;~#atUln in 00tobel' 19.61li.~h1'eatening thet t1rl~~a l!I 'llhl!!'
1ftDlplomatlc ~1an~..,J~~~,4; Nell1 Statesmen, LXV,I!;(Bchr.e$\"Iel'
... (!}6 J·) 684 . " .....,.< -\1.7'+, .' '.••
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ag~icultu~al comtnon market, developed on schedule, France
would walk out). 'In De'oamber, Germany conceO,ed in part' be-'
cause the other lEO partners ooneider~d'rancEJt1;1' demand.s
on cereal prioes legltlmate.
Though compromise and OOl'lossslon might work out· dirt!...
culi economic difference. wi thin E:a:~, polt,tleal dirt~zt­
anoes remained irreconcilable. The idea. that de Gaulle'
would ecuttle the Common it'1arket ove:rthe poll tical issu.e
:Q.asbeend1soountfJd by some. French economy had become
deeply l~teg:r8.ted into' EECdur1.ng ita first s 1xyears.
The draft ot the tifth French economic plan (1966.1970) was
based on the assumpt10fi.'otEBC development. Halt France' $
tra,de outside the f:ranc ares. 'ia (,Hil'rled on 1n EWa, and she
was the greateat bel'leticiar~., 'ot the Comnt.on Market's agr1-
cul:t,uralpol.lcy.2 De Gau.lle hlm$slf lnApr11 1964 announced
1;hat tiLt;tleby 11ttle the,!uropean QOrrl$on Ma,l'ket is beco1l'l-
1nges$entlal to ourprQ.perl ty. t.t3 On the other hand ..
de G8.l111e hat' never indioated ths.'b he would sacrifice one
of h18~ajQX- goals,nat1onal 1ndepen4enoe, tQ1J $oonoml0
advantagt.
Juat as the issues qf, Sri tl«tb, membershl',: and. agrlcul-
turelprlcin,g had d1vl(.t~4'".:<!~ Gaulle and Erhard, 1n 1965
ltlThe General Picks Hia Sa ttlef1eld, ,. ,91"
~Godfrey. 12,.
3Willls, 314 ..
poll tical development becaTa8 the topic of debate. The
thl~d stage or E»;O maturity was due to come into being in
1966 and hinged on major steps towaz-d politieal integra-
tion. Majolllty voting, whioh would end national vetoes,
ultimate pa~11amente.r1 control ot EEe funds; direct elec-
tion otthe Parliament; all these measures embodied the
15uprahatiotlal na.ture otEIC thai de Gaulle denied.
".,' .
D.Gaulle, .t' a countermove; p%'opoaed th.at thfJHigh
Autl'lor1 ty and the:~ Oonun1;as1one tor iura tom and REO be aom-
"
bined but wi th eon.$lderabJ,;t leas than supran.ational qual1-
,
~mo~'t; serious or1.~e t):J.eEuropean Oommunity ~a,sexper:t~nced
; to :dtAte.2 June 30 f 1;965,~~,"the Frenoh goveX'l:llQerit1'eoal~ed
M.BQegrJ.e1' j 1t 8 am.baa!$,ad.()~:- to 'bhe European OQlt1l11utl tt,l# •.•·thus
$fte9tlng a Frenoh. boYcott 01 leaving an t1enil?~~t'Ch..l.;r.;tt
, "
~~llliJulY through Deo"l»b." 196$ coxnmunityettortawe:rt*. dead...
. , - .. '.. ,
looked, The reaul$ot·~b.necember 1965 FX'enoh electlon
indloatedan end. t-o the·boYOott ot EED. On the' f1~st
be.llRt 56% of tbe Frenchvot&d against de Gaulle.. This
,. . ...
• . . i
mt:1y'l:u~ve atrengthenedthe display of community oppoelt1on
lpeterJenk1rJs, u~:rope t sFreeze, t' (N.wStatesman.
LXX (July 9, 196$), :;7"
2 .... .'. . ..
Edgar Stephen eon FurniSS,. Jr.,.. ".FrenchForelgnP011CY, "
CU:J:'r'en t. fr1storl, L (Apr! 1, 196b), 213.
J-!-5
to him. l De Gaulle himself may have fe·l t e. need to o'btain
greeter 13upport in France b3' rejoining BEO. At any rate, in
Janua.ry- 1966 negQ'tit\tions resumed, though they only resulted
in agreeing to qieagree, and struoturally the E1J;c stalemate
continued. 2
In the last two or three ye$ra,' lome Westdl-ermana
haVe beeom., disillualGlled. wIth. interne. t1onallam.) Trade
outside th. Common P>'lark,et 11 mo~e important to Gerrtl8nythen
to France'. Was the EEe ,aIm of • oommon eeol"l'oml<l 'policy
IIeally'sole to aeoomodate, the be1&t1nt$re$te of hot1'lout-
wQ:rdlook1bg Germlnyandlrrward look\1ngFranee?' Some
, .' . "
Germans btgan to wonder"lt REO ,w.,. nota d:rag on 'the 'Germany
ec,o.notny. 'Fort tne1'l1E}J;(j was,me:ant to give Germany 'apa,th back
toaoeept8.fte~ Ell 8. natlons.nd 0n.oe thQtwaaachieveq. the
appealwe.s. gre$tly dlmlnl$hed.4 Germanyin'1964 h.d >the
thtlid large.t g:rOlanat1opal produot!rl' the ',We"l'ld:~t,t 1$
-nowbnd.ar' th~t Wl111~';and~ has deelAX'ed;"W.·:cWe,s.t aetrm.ans
cannot' :be an econom1c·'gt..ritand a pollt1eal'dwarf'a·tthe
same, 'time."
. ,
'1'0 de Gaulle; whocori$l$tentll,.*-,intait~(tdtnat'lnu.rope
(Deoember
-'" ' ~'I~ ;,'t- ';_~'. ',~, ,~,.,)~
1ftHas It, ReallyChanged,ft'$conom1a,t, CCCXVI!
11, ·1965), 1173. '. ','-"~
2FurnissJ "French For$:l..gn Policy," 2,31.
3lienr-y c. Wolfe, ttAWorr1ed Look et West Ger~many,n
$aturdalR~view, XLIX (March 26, 1966), 22.
4scnmakel, 287. 5Wolfe, 48.
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1s made up ot nation at. tea, there w•• nothing unusual or
unexpected in German nationalism coming to the fore. It
. a.lw.·Y's existed. German reunification wa, .. point or thll
natlon,lietl0 drive. It was the desire for Ge~m.n re-
unification that led Adenauer to ohoose alllanoewlth the
West in o:rder to be in • strong pos!tlon for flJvent'l.lal
negotiating with the eovlet Union. Erhard oontlnued
that polioy, but .1~h••ll.d the importanoe or the United
States, rather thIn F:tlropem integration, to German re-
unification. During the Adenauer year8, de atlulletrled
to establish Weet Germany'_ role ••• divided state,
oontrolled by the European Community, and .! an effective
ally in .trengthen1ng the West with. focus on France,l
Erhard ohallenged th~. European view and did not consider
independence trom the Un! ted St.~te. in the best intereat
of the Federal Republio. De Gaulle had uaed the crises
in EEO in an attempt to pressure Germany into loosening
tle$ with the United St.tel. Hie realization th.t Weat
Germany wae not going to play the role that he had eat
for he~ led de G.ull~ to consider a new Ge~man pollcy.
If • d.lv1d~d Germ.Tty would not eerve Franoe'. purpose,
pe:rhape ., reunified one would. At the Februa.Y' 4, 1965
presa oonfepenoe, President de Gaulle said that German
reunification was an objeot of French foreign policy, and
1Godfrey, 130.
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that the price ot Oe%'man x-eunlt1oatlon Wl.8 an agreement on
armaments and trontlere. The moat common 1nte~p~etatlon
put on de Gaulle's reference to armaments was that he meant
no nuolear weapon. for Germans; it was also alsumed that
when he spoke of frontiers he meant the Oder...N.,1e.e line. 1
In.addition, he demanded that Germany had to be 1m ttaaaurted
factor tor p.aoe and progre.s." But how could Germany be
kept assuredly peaceful within the boundaries oontaining
East and 'Weat Oermany a. they ex1.'.d. In 19651 E••tern
Europe had to be brought 1n'o <tont.in aermany 1n the e.st
while France ·provided thai ••rv1ce in the west, For this
purpo•• UJJ;agre,ement Lwlth the Sovl.' Un'ion wal neoesaary.2
Mutual Franoo-Ru•• ian d••ire to .ee nucl.ar arm. kept out
ot Germany and to .ee AmeJ"1omtJ"OOP.l~aveEuJ"ope provided
the basis toJ" the hope that .uch an asr~ement coUld be
reaohed. De Gaulle antic1pated thai d1.~.gr.ementa between
~;
Peking ap.d fvloloo'W would make the SOV1.t1~ Un1onmor$ w1111ng
'\
to seek the benetita to b. derived rromt cooperation w1th
France on a·mutual Germanpo11cy. De a.ulle ba.ed hi•
.design, on two .ssumptions t One was tha,t the Soviet Union
would part with East Germany; the leoond wa. that Germany
1ftGrPMykO Oome. to Pari.," The Econom1at, COX1I1
(May 1, 1965), 510,
2Joeeph Kraft, "What Does de Gaulle Want?"- Current
XXXV (May, J.966), 10,.
would acoept dominion by the ~eli of Europero~ the sake of
national reun1on. l
Theneoeseary px-erequls1te to de Gaulle's neW Germ.an
policy was. Franoo-Rusalan rapprochement. Khrulchev'a
I!IUCOeSBors', aware ot Franco-German dl seord, 'published two
messagee ana two editorial. in PraVda and Izvestia laying
th~ groundwork: tormbJ:'e oordial rela tiona between Jiloaoow
and Plri.~2 The tlrat odnoret. 'action wa•• Prenchgrlnt
ot seven year credit. to the Bovle' Union 10 a Franco-
Russian 'trade agreement in Ootob.~ 1964. Then de Gaulle's
speech on a.man reunification 11'1 1965wa. followed up bY'
a change ot'Ru.a1m atnb••••dor.:' the higher ranking
'Valerian Zor!n X'eplaoed 'SeztgeY' Vlnogradov .s arub.seador to
France, and'thl8 wa. taken to 1ndio.teau.sian 'reoeptivene8s
to French appro a oheI. On MaY' 1, 196$ Hu. .1. t. Fo:re1gn
Minister Andr.l Grom1ko visited Paria, ar.d Germany. wa. the
primary 1.iued1scu•••d during tnl. viali. At about the
.am. time there ooourred an int.rest1ng indireot 111u••
tration ot a posBible 'rapprochement: the Soviet Union
ohose the Fr$noh system of color telev1elon over those ot
west· Ge~any and the UnIted Statel, -.nd moet of Eastern
Tmrope, including East Germany followed the Soviet's lead
;,' ,
1rtDe Gaulle's Golden Gate," Eoonomist, COXIV (Feb-
ruary 1.3, 196.$) ,6$4..
, ,. 2"~r1ehdlY Breeie!," Eoonomist, COXIII (October 31,
1964), 492.
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in that choioe. Th1a meant that if We8v Germany followed
through on 1'15 own 8"8tem or on the Amerioan system, it
would not be able to ~e·.c~ East German soreen$. In this
way, Fra~:UH'> and the Soviet Union quickly .howed west
Germany how effectively they oan work together.
Being in the middle, We.t Germany did not like the
turn French polioy! took, Welt Germany wa. pleased when
France approved the German propos.l that the United st.'.a,
Br1tam and france tluSg•• ' to the Soviet Union the setting
up ot a permanent committee to study German reun1fleatlon.2
But later developmenta, beg1nn1ns with the long term credits
which Franoe' extended to the Soviet Union, aroused west
German hOltll1ty.
1
Herbert Luthy, "De Gaulle: Pose and Policy," Foreign
Afta1ra, XLIX! (July, 1965),' $62,
2nLove in • Cold Olimate," Eoonomist, eCXIV (January
23, 1965), 328~ I
v• OON CLUSI ON
In spite or the Ghange. that have taken place 1n hil
tactic., President de Gaulle'. long range go.la remained
unchanged. Whether hi. words were uttered in 1946 or 1965,
when de Gaulle spoke ot France he insIsted that her'dee-
tiny we•••• great uld 1ndep.ndent world power. To live
this part, F~.noe must be aecurely protected militarily,
soundly established economloally,and sutficiently re-
spected diplom•. tically. Any polIcy aL--necl at obtaining'
the•• Frenoh object!••• had to oonsider Germany'. position.
Frenoh government. tried to keep Germany unarmed or in a
subordinate po.ltlon ml11tax-11y through the demilitari-
zation plan. ot the post war year., through the EDe effort.
ot the early 1950's, and through NATO limit. in the 1960·s.
The l •• t trend dl.oernable in Frenoh pollcy, whioh became
clear in 1964 and 196$, WI' the lugg•• tlon or • cont.in-
ment ot Germany by France and Ea.tern Europe. Despite
the effort. ot French governments, however, Germlny by
1965 had. revived militarily a. evldencedby a nationll
army wholly committed to NATO and by involvement in the
'MLF projeot.
Eoonom1c dealings with w•• t Germany were inevit.ble
considering France and Germany's geographl0 position 1n
the heart of Western ~urope. 'l'he first postwar policy ot
e~plo1t.tion of Germany oeased to be the only French
51
Approaoh when Marshall P18n aid became available. The
.moat durable contribution to Franeo-Germ.n rel•. tione W'.s
the establishment or the European Community. In spite or
Technioal diffioultlel end divergent viewpoints, the
European Community had accomplished mueh in European in-
duetrial recovery. Even de GaUlle, 'Who disagreed fund.·
mentelly with the lntegratlonlata aspeots ot the Com-
munity, oontinued French participation in EEC and worked
to implement BEe in order to advance French economio in-
tereeta. In partlcul.r in the rleld of agriCUlture there
was French advantage in aerm.n oooperation in EEC.
France _merged from World War II a. • power of
aecond,'not tlr_t rank. H.~ view. regarding postwar
Germany did not carry enough weight with her a111&8 to b,
effeotive. When French functionalist. plaoed France at
the tore of the Europe.n unlflca tlon movemen t, they took
the first step toward r~.toring French prestige. Through
leadership in the European Community Franc8 made her In-
fluence tel t in Germany •. s well as in other part! of the
world, But the Fourth Republio, for the moat p.~t, be-
lieved in a stl'ong Atlantio alliance as • means or present-
ing a d1plom.tlc.ll~· unified front,. When de Gaulle re-
tux-ned to leadership in Franoe, he e,tabllshed, on the
oontrary, an independent Frenoh foreign polioy which di-
reotly used the Community machinery to further French dip-
lomatic alma. When he decided that the l!:uropean bal moe or
$2
power had ohanged, the Frenchpl'eeldent .fo:rmul.t~d his own
pollcy on hqwtod,eal with Germany, .eek1ng ne1 the%- .<1.v~se'
o:r con.eent -from ~r.nce'. allies,. Whatever twistlor tUM'
l'e+.at1o.ns w1th·:Germany m.y t.~e,.Pre.1dent de Gaulle e.-
tabl1abed the tenent. that French polioy will be. lnde~
pen~f);no•• -lld that Germany mu.t aerv. that,tenent. 02:'
Frattoo.Qel'nlan, ~el.t1~n. wl1lnou,progre•• smoothly_
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